The following was a short essay written for one of last semester’s courses. Read it as an academic essay, not a blog post (yes, I know this is a blog, but I can’t exactly post Word documents here)
In all debates concerning abortion, it has become increasingly obvious that the issue boils down to a question of where human life begins. Many women feel that they have sovereign right over the embryo at all stages of development because it is simply a part of their body. However, this argument flies in the face of basic biology and genetics. In doing so, it has many different implications for other pro-choice arguments.
The argument that is usually heard is something along the lines of “it’s my body” or “it’s just a lump of cells, not a person.” These types of argument seem to come intuitively. We all know and experience people and know what humans look like. Surely a microscopic ball of cells cannot be described as a person. It is merely a part of the woman’s own body, and therefore she should have the same right to destroy it as she does to cut her hair or fingernails. This position fails not because of some lofty, complicated religious principle, but from the very basics of biology.
In order to understand the nature of the debate, the discussion must start from the ground up and ask “where does life begin?” This is somewhat of a misleading question as there is no doubt as to whether or not a zygote is alive. Many are apt to claim that it is just a “mass” of cells and dismiss it as unimportant. What is crucial to remember is that size has no bearing on whether or not something may be alive. The zygote (fertilized egg) may be a single cell, but so are most bacteria, and protists, which are all considered to be living. While a strict definition of life is a debated issue, the main “definition” is actually more of a list of certain features that are recognized as signs of life. These things include, but are not limited to “reproduction, growth, metabolism, movement, responsiveness, and adaptation.”[1] As the fertilized egg displays many of these traits, (most notably reproduction as it divides) it would be very strange if someone were to doubt its status as a living thing. With this made clear, it becomes evident that what the question of “human life” addresses is mostly concerned with the human aspect. The question is not “is it alive?” as much as “is it a human?”
There are many stages in the life of the embryo that cannot be described as looking “human”. However, appearances of a living organism do not typically determine what it is. That is the work of the specialized DNA code of the organism. When fertilization occurs, half of the father’s chromosomes and half of the mother’s chromosomes combine to form a full set of chromosomes. This does not simply mash the two together – their combination creates an entirely new set of DNA, unique to each individual (except for identical twins, of course).
This means two things, each of equal importance. First, the DNA of these cells is what classifies it as human, not the way it looks. As Hadley Arkes notes, “all species are identified biologically by their genetic composition, and by that measure the offspring of Homo sapiens cannot be anything other than Homo sapiens.”[2] Genetics are not to be taken as a part of what determines the status of a human – they are indeed the only thing that could establish this. With the mapping of the human genome finally being completed, geneticists can now fully differentiate human DNA from that of apes, cows, and corn. This also means that humans can only bear humans and come from humans. This all seems pretty elementary, but has profound implications for many a pro-choice argument. Many push the idea of the “ball of cells” to establish that what is in the womb is not human. Considering the scientific fact that humans come only from humans and that that is determined by the DNA of the cells, one must wonder, if this “ball” is not human, what else could it possibly be?
The second thing to draw from this is just as important as the first. The fact that the DNA of the cells is unique means that is not “part” of the woman’s body. A more accurate way to describe the situation would be that the zygote contains part of the mother in that half of its DNA is from its mother’s egg. However, let us not forget that the other half of its genetic material is from its father. It is precisely the combination of these two halves that distinguish it from either one of its parents. It has a completely different genetic makeup than its parents, and is therefore a completely different being. The rights of the mother can no longer extend to justify abortion, as the zygote is not part of her own body. This is why the famous “sperm murder” myth that pro-choice advocates sometimes bring up is preposterous. This myth states that if abortion were outlawed, then male masturbation would have to be outlawed as well because sperm are being killed. This argument does not make sense in reference to genetic science. The sperm (and egg) are each a part of the mother and father because they contain the DNA of the mother or father, not of a new being. Yes, they have potential to form a unique being, but this does not make them unique beings in themselves.
The implications of genetic biology make it clear that a human cannot produce anything but a human. Therefore, scientifically speaking, it is nearly impossible to argue that an embryo is not a human life. The notion that a fetus is not a human life should then become a nonissue. Perhaps the more intriguing question is whether or not the fetus is a person and whether or not one can be human and not be a person. The arguments for this are also extensive, but cannot be approached without first understanding of the nature of the fertilized cell. Discussion of embryo status must start with the DNA code in the zygote cell.
[1] “Biological life.” Hutchinson Encyclopedia. http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/Biological+life (accessed April 26, 2012).
[2] Arkes, Hadley. First things: an inquiry into the first principles of morals and justice. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986, 364.
Nothing to See 